A noncooperative model of a normal form game is developed using tools from fuzzy set theory. The paper extends the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. We identify conditions for the existence of equilibrium in this setting and provide a duopoly example. The paper also provides a review of the existing literature on noncooperative fuzzy games and their applications.
Introduction
In a recent issue of this journal an interesting paper by West and Linster (January, 2003) uses fuzzy rules to show that Nash equilibrium behavior can be achieved by boundedly rational agents in two-player games with inÞnite strategy spaces. These rules are based on the notion of triangular numbers from fuzzy set theory and are posited as "rules of thumb" type behaviors. Updating based on these rules is utilized in the genetic algorithm developed for the simulations in the repeated game. Their most interesting Þnd is that for fuzzy rules using only the most recent histories, play converges to the analytical Nash equilibria of the games considered in the paper. However there is yet no theoretical foundation for such fuzzy rule based games. This paper provides a theoretical foundation for games based on fuzzy rules by developing a simple static normal form fuzzy game where both payoffs and strategies of players are modelled as fuzzy sets.
The behavior of players in a game depends on the structure of the game being played. This involves the decisions they face and the information they have when making decisions, how their decisions determine the outcome, as well as the preferences they have over the outcomes. The structure also incorporates the possibility of repetition, the implementation of any correlating devices and alternative forms of communication. Any imprecision regarding the structure of the game has consequences for the outcome. Yet, in the real-world decision making often takes place in an environment in which the objectives, the constraints and the outcomes faced by the players are not known in a precise manner. Ambiguities can exist if the components of the game are speciÞed with some vagueness or when the players have their own subjective perception of the game.
Psychological games analyzed by Geanakoplous, Pearce and Staccehtti (1989) and the model of fairness developed by Rabin (1993) are two examples of where the players have their own interpretation of the game. The psychological game is deÞned on an underlying material game (the standard game that one normally assumes the agents are playing) in which beliefs about reciprocal behavior by the other players generates additional (psychological) payoffs. Chen, Freidman and Thisse (1997) have a model of boundedly rational behavior where the players have a latent subconscious utility function and are not precisely aware of the actual utility associated with each outcome. Over time they learn the true nature of their utility and play converges to the Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we develop a descriptive theory to analyze games with such characteristics using a fuzzy set-theoretic toolkit. We assume that the components of the game involve subjective perception on the part of the players. The model builds on the work of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) who analyze decision-making in a fuzzy environment, and extends it to a gametheoretic setting. A fuzzy set differs from a classical set (referred to as a crisp set hereafter) in that the characteristic function can take any value in the interval [0, 1] . In this manner it replaces the binary (Aristotelian) logic framework of set theory and incorporates "fuzziness" by appealing to multi-valued logic. For instance, a person who is 6 feet tall can have a high membership value (in the characteristic function sense) in the set of "tall people" and a low membership value in the set of "short people". 1 Providing general tools to model such subjective perceptions is one of the main advantages of the fuzzy set theory since dual membership instances of this type cannot arise in the context of crisp sets. The underlying motive behind much of fuzzy set theory is that by introducing imprecision of this sort in a formal manner into crisp set theory, we can analyze complex and realistic versions of problems involving information processing and decision making.
In the conventional approach to decision-making a decision process is represented by (a) a set of alternatives, (b) a set of constraints restricting choices between the different alternatives, 2 and (c) a performance function which associates with each alternative the gain (or loss) resulting from the choice of that alternative. When decision-making occurs in a fuzzy environment characterized by ambiguity and vagueness, Bellman and Zadeh (1970) argue that a different and perhaps more natural conceptual framework suggests itself. They argue that it is not always appropriate to equate imprecision with randomness and provide a distinction between randomness and fuzziness. 3 Randomness deals with uncertainty concerning non-membership or membership of an object in a non-fuzzy set. Fuzziness on the other hand is concerned with grades of membership in a set, which may take intermediate values between 0 and 1. A fuzzy goal of an agent is a statement like "my payoff should be approximately 50" and a fuzzy constraint may be expressed as "the outcome should lie in the medium range". This is similar to the rules of thumb followed by the players in West and Linster (2003) : If the other player produces x I will produce y. Here x and y can even be a range of numbers or linguistic descriptors like "medium" or "high". The most important feature of this framework is its symmetry with respect to goals and constraints − a symmetry which erases the differences between them and makes it possible to relate in a particularly simple way, the concept of decision making to those of the goals and constraints of a decision process.
Our model is similar in spirit to the Bellman and Zadeh (1970) approach and models the standard game as a set of constraints and goals which can then be solved like a decision-making problem, while taking the other player's actions into account. The fuzzy extension of the standard game in our framework will have fuzzy payoffs which represent the goals of the players. We will deÞne a fuzzy extension of the strategies of both the players effectively limiting the choices of both players. The equilibrium concept will be identical to the Nash equilibrium, except that it will now be deÞned on the fuzzy extension of the game. This is unlike the formulation of fuzzy noncooperative games in Butnariu (1978 Butnariu ( , 1979 and Billot (1992) where the payoffs functions are completely absent since they are subsumed into abstract beliefs. The solution in their model imposes very high information requirements on the deÞnition of a game making the equilibrium unappealing. Moreover it is also rather cumbersome to translate their model into standard game theoretic terms. Our formulation is easier to interpret and is closer to the standard model of noncooperative games.
This paper adds to the literature in several ways. We provide an alternative way to model at noncooperative games that is more appropriate in situations where there might be a highly subjective component to the game, thereby providing a foundation to the work of West and Linster (2003) . We prove the existence of equilibrium in a fuzzy game. We identify conditions to guarantee a minimum level of payoffs in games involving such subjective elements. We also show the existence of equilibrium in the fuzzy version of zero-sum games called one-sum games. A simple duopoly application is presented before suggesting directions for further work. It is also worth mentioning that given the descriptive nature of the formulation, there is a trade-off in terms of its predictive abilities. Finally, the paper also provides a review of the existing (albeit small) literature on noncooperative fuzzy games.
The next section describes some of the basic concepts of fuzzy set theory. Section 3 provides a review of the existing work on noncooperative fuzzy games. Section 4 presents the model along with a few results. The Þnal section has some concluding remarks.
Mathematical Preliminaries
The seminal formulation of the concepts of fuzzy sets is due to Zadeh (1965) who generalized the idea of a classical set by extending the range of its characteristic function. 4 Informally, a fuzzy set is a class of objects for which there is no sharp boundary between those objects that belong to the class, and those that do not. Here we provide some deÞnitions that are pertinent to our work. Let X denote a universe of discourse. We distinguish between crisp or traditional and fuzzy subsets of X.
DeÞnition 1
The characteristic function Ψ A of a crisp set A maps the elements of X to the elements of the set {0, 1}, i.e., Ψ A : X → {0, 1}. For each x ∈ X,
To go from this deÞnition to a fuzzy set we need to expand the set {0,1} to the set [0,1] with 0 and 1 representing the lowest and highest grades of membership (or degree of belongingness) respectively. We introduce two additional deÞnitions about functions before moving to fuzzy sets.
DeÞnition 2
The function f is quasiconcave if and only if for all x, x 0 ∈ X and all λ ∈ [0, 1] we have
DeÞnition 3
The function f deÞned on the convex set X is strictly quasiconcave if and only if for all x, x 0 ∈ X with x 6 = x 0 and all λ ∈ (0, 1)
In other words, a function is quasiconcave if and only if the line segment joining the points on two level curves lies nowhere below the level curve corresponding to the lower value of the function. A function is strictly quasiconcave if every point, except the endpoints, on any line segment joining points on two level curves yields a higher value for the function than does any point on the level curve correponding to the lower value of the function. We now introduce the basic mathematics of fuzzy sets.
DeÞnition 4
The membership function µ A of a fuzzy set A maps the elements of X to the elements of the set [0, 1], i.e., µ A :
Membership functions have also been used as belief functions and can be viewed as non-additive probabilities. For a discussion of these issues see Klir and Yuan (1995) and Billot (1991) . The fuzzy set A itself is deÞned as the graph of µ A :
The sole purpose of this deÞnition is to have something at hand that is literally a set. All the properties of fuzzy sets are deÞned in terms of their membership functions. For example, a fuzzy set A is called normal when sup x µ A (x) = 1. To emphasize that, indeed, all the properties of fuzzy sets are actually attributes of their membership functions, suppose that X is a nonempty subset of a Euclidean space. Then A is called convex, if µ A is quasi-concave. 5 We highlight further some other important deÞnitions terms of the membership function.
DeÞnition 5
The fuzzy set B is a subset of the fuzzy set A if and only if
for all x ∈ X.
DeÞnition 6
The complement of a fuzzy set A is fuzzy set CA with the membership function
Elements of X for which µ A (x) = µ CA (x) are sometimes referred to using the misleading term "equilibrium points". We now deÞne the basic set theoretic notions of union and intersection. Let A and B be two fuzzy sets.
DeÞnition 7
The membership function µ F (x) of the intersection F = A ∩ B is deÞned pointwise by
Similarly for the union operation, the membership function of
These deÞnitions of union and intersection in the context of fuzzy sets are due to Zadeh (1965) . While alternative formulations of the union and intersection property exist, Bellman and Giertz (1973) prove that this is the most consistent way of deÞning these operations. They also provide an axiomatic discussion of other standard set-theoretic operations in the context of fuzzy sets. The upper contour sets of a fuzzy set are called α-cuts and introduced next.
The crisp set A α of elements of X that belong to the fuzzy set A at least to the degree α is called the α-cut of the fuzzy set A:
Moreover, we deÞne the strict α-cut A * α of A as the crisp set
In particular, A 0 = X and
We next deÞne the notion of a fuzziÞed function and the extension principle for a fuzzy function. We say that a crisp function f : X → Y is fuzziÞed when it is extended to act on fuzzy sets deÞned on X and Y . The fuzziÞed function for which the same symbol f is used commonly has the form f :
, where F(X) denotes the fuzzy power set of X (the set of all fuzzy subsets of X). The principle for fuzzifying crisp functions (or crisp relations) is called the extension principle.
DeÞnition 9 The Extension Principle:
Detailed expositions of different aspects of fuzzy set theory and their numerous applications can be found in a number of excellent textbooks (see for instance Zimmermann (1990) , and Klir and Yuan (1995) ).
Review of the Existing Literature
In this section we review alternative approaches to modeling noncooperative fuzzy games. The most prominent theoretical work in this area is the formulation of noncooperative fuzzy games due to Butnariu (1978 Butnariu ( , 1979 and Billot (1992) . In the Butnariu-Billot formulation players have the usual strategies and beliefs about what strategies the other players will choose in the game. These beliefs are described by fuzzy sets over the strategy space of the other players. Players in such a fuzzy game choose strategies that maximize the membership value of their belief about the other players and while doing this tries to minimize the restrictions he imposes on others. They do not explicitly pursue an objective function. However, the equilibrium concept requires very restrictive assumptions, i.e., full information about beliefs, making the formulation quite uninteresting. A detailed description of this model is given in Haller and Sarangi (2000) . The interested reader may refer to this paper for a critique and reformulation of the Butnariu-Billot model.
In this section we will discuss other approaches to noncooperative fuzzy games, as well as some applications. 6 The two other theoretical approaches in the literature only provide techniques to analyze zero-sum games. Campos (1989) uses linear programming to model matrix games, and Billot (1992) uses lexicographic fuzzy preferences to identify equilibria in a normal form game. We also discuss two application of fuzzy sets to Industrial Organization. The Þrst by Greenhut, Greenhut and Mansur (1995) is an application to modelling a quantity setting oligopoly, and the second application due to Goodhue (1998) analyzes collusion through a fuzzy trigger strategy. We start with the two theoretical approaches followed by the applications.
The Linear Programming Approach
Campos (1989) introduces a number of different types of linear programming (LP) models to solve zero-sum fuzzy normal form games. In his formulation, each player's strategy set is a crisp set, but players have imprecise knowledge about the payoffs. A zero-sum two person fuzzy game is represented by G = (S 1 , S 2 , e A), where S 1 and S 2 denote the pure strategy sets of the two players. Assume that player 1 is the row player and use i for her strategies and player 2 is the column player and hence his strategies will be referred to by j. We assume that player 1 has m strategies and player 2 has n strategies. Then e A = (e a ij ) is an m × n matrix of fuzzy numbers, i.e., numbers that lie in the [0,1] interval. The fuzzy numbers are deÞned by their membership functions as follows:
This membership function captures the information that player 1 has about her payoffs and also the information about player 2's payoffs associated with the i−th strategy and j−th strategy choices by the two players respectively. Campos (1989) argues that payoffs need to be represented by fuzzy numbers since in many real world situations players may not be aware of their exact payoffs. In standard game-theoretic terms the above operation using the membership function just normalizes the payoffs of each player to the interval [0,1]. However, since the players have imprecise knowledge of their own payoffs, Campos (1989) allows for "soft constraints", i.e., each player is willing to permit some ßexibility in satisfying the constraints. Hence we can write down player 1's problem as 7 Max v s.t.
where ≥ represents the fuzzy constraint, v represents the security level for player 1 and s i ∈ S 1 . Notice that the problem now involves double fuzziness since the payoff functions are represented membership functions and the constraint is also fuzzy. The LP problem in the above form is intractable and needs to be modiÞed further. For this we deÞne u i = s i /v, and thus v = P s i / P u i = 1/ P u i . Using this we can restate the original LP problem in terms of it dual as Min P u i subject to
whose solution is easier to obtain. The resolution of a fuzzy constraint of the type shown above relies on a technique introduced by Adamo (1980) . The fuzzy constraint is now substituted by a convex constraint given by
, where e p j is a fuzzy number that expresses the maximum violation that player 1 will permit in the accomplishment of his constraint, and º is the relation which the decision maker chooses for ranking the fuzzy numbers. 8 Fuzzy set theory provides for numerous ways of ranking fuzzy numbers. Campos (1989) considers Þve different ways of ranking fuzzy numbers, and for each case rewrites the constraints using fuzzy triangular numbers. Two of these are based on the work of Yager (1981) and involves the use of a ranking 7 Player 2's problem is a standard minimization problem and for the sake of brevity will not be shown here. The interested reader may refer to Friedman (1990) for more on zero-sum games. 8 The only requirement for this relation is that it must preserve the ranking of the fuzzy numbers under linear transformations. function or index that maps the fuzzy numbers onto R. A third approach involves the use of α−cuts and is based on the work of Adamo (1980) . The last two approaches rank fuzzy numbers using possibility theory. This stems from the work of Dubois and Prade (1983) . Finally, the Þve different parametric LP models obtained through this transformation process are solved using conventional LP techniques to identify their fuzzy solutions. This exercise is performed with different numerical examples.
The primary limitation of this approach is that it is suited only for linear programming type formulations thereby limiting itself to zero sum games. This places great restriction on the payoffs and also the constraints. Moreover the paper demonstrates its results primarily through speciÞc numerical examples, and thus is devoid of generalizations.
A Fuzzy Game with Lexicographic Preferences
Billot (1992) develops an alternative model of fuzzy games using fuzzy lexicographic preorderings. This rudimentary formulation is applicable only to zero-sum games. Unlike the model originally developed by Butnariu (1978 Butnariu ( , 1979 , this is an ordinal game, and differs from the standard game theoretic formulation only by allowing for fuzzy lexicographic preferences. He introduces an axiom called the Axiom of Local non-Discrimination according to which a player is assumed to be indifferent between two very close options. However, such indifference is not unique and its intensity is allowed to take values between 0 and 1. This degree of intensity is captured using a membership function. Next it is shown that under the above axiom, a fuzzy lexicographic preorder can be represented by a continuous utility function deÞned on a connected referential set X ⊆ R.
A normal form game is deÞned as
where Σ i is the strategy space which is assumed to be a real convex set. An individual strategy is denoted by σ i ∈ Σ i and the strategies of all the other players by σ −i ∈ Σ −i = × j6 =i Σ j . Here P i denotes the payoff of function, P i : × n i=1 Σ i → R and is assumed to be continuous. Next he introduces a transformation function that orders the strategies lexicographically based on the payoffs they yield. Recall that under the axiom, a fuzzy lexicographic preorder can be represented by a continuous utility function. Since this utility function can now be deÞned on the set of strategies, Billot calls this a strategic utility function. He then proves an existence result for two-person zero sum games under fairly simple conditions. It is shown that if the axiom is satisÞed, the strategy space is compact and convex, and the payoff function is continuous, then an equilibrium will exist. Further it is shown that for inessential games where the payoffs and the strategies satisfy the conditions listed above, the equilibrium set derived using fuzzy lexicographic preferences contains the usual set of Nash equilibria.
In terms of technicalities Billiot's work is interesting since it proves an existence result and the equilibria derived using lexicographic preferences contain the usual Nash equilibria. The drawbacks lie in the fact that it is necessary to assume lexicographic preferences and that results are applicable mainly to zero sum games.
A Fuzzy Approach to Oligopolistic Competition
Greenhut, Greenhut and Mansur (1995) apply fuzzy set theory to model oligopolistic competition. Their objective is to characterize the problem of a real world oligopolistic market from the perspective of the decision maker in a Þrm. A Þrm i may be ranked as a strong or a weak rival by Þrm j depending on the degree of its inclusion in the oligopoly. For example, in the soft drink industry Coke and Pepsi are the dominant Þrms, but smaller rivals also exist,and each of the two leading Þrms may be interested in taking the actions of these smaller rivals into account. The degree of inclusion of these small Þrms in the oligopoly then quantiÞes the importance that ought to be given to the actions of the smaller rivals. It is argued that quantiÞcation of real world setting in this manner will be of great help to these decision makers. Greenhut et al. (1995) claim that an oligopoly can be described as competition among a few Þrms producing similar products. They use three different fuzzy sets to model the vague (italicized) linguistic terms in above the deÞnition of an oligopoly. 9 Each fuzzy descriptor captures the degree to which a particular Þrm belongs to the oligopolistic market when compared with a representative Þrm F i whose membership in the oligopoly is of degree one. The Þrst category is similar products and is used to model the notion that Þrms do not produce exactly identical products. The membership function expresses how a particular Þrm's product compares to the product of the representative Þrm. The fuzzy set S * contains the membership value of each Þrm in the industry vis-a-vis product similarity.
The next aspect of oligopolies that is modeled in the paper is the degree of inter-dependence between Þrms. This is denoted by the fuzzy set I * , which is the fuzzy set of Þrms whose membership grades represent the degree of perceived inter-dependence between a Þrm and the Þrm F i , quantifying the degree of strategic rivalry between Þrms.
The third category mentioned in their formulation is the notion of a few Þrms. The fuzzy set F * denotes the fuzzy membership of Þrms in the industry where a degree of membership is assigned to the discrete numbers belonging to N. The authors regard the number of Þrms in the industry to be inexact by appealing to the possibility of free entry and exit, and the fact that geographical boundaries between competing Þrms are not well deÞned.
The oligopoly itself is denoted by the fuzzy set O * which is a combination of S * , I * and F * . It now expresses the fact that an oligopoly is competition among a few interdependent Þrms producing similar products. The degree of membership of any particular Þrm in O * is obtained by applying Zadeh's Extension Principle. The authors illustrate their point by means of a numerical example. Using numerical examples they also show how fuzzy set theory can be used to compute a fuzzy HerÞndahl Index.
Although the approach suggested by Greenhut et al. (1995) is interesting, it does not provide satisfactory answers to basic oligopoly questions. The membership grades used in their examples are completely subjective and arguably arbitrary. The authors argue that though they use subjective membership functions, accepting the possibility of a fuzzy model will allow us to develop more realistic oligopoly models in conjunction with econometric techniques which may be used to obtain membership functions. Further, while it may be hard to quibble with the idea of using a fuzzy set to model product homogeneity, the last two fuzzy categories used in deÞning an oligopoly, namely the notion of inter-dependent Þrms and a few Þrms is clearly debatable. Inter-dependence among Þrms is usually not a subjective issue, while the notion of a few Þrms based on geography is more appropriate for retail stores. In a certain sense the paper also fails to deliver, since it does not suggest how to solve a quantity setting or a price setting game between Þrms after computing the degree of inclusion of each Þrm in the oligopoly. This clearly remains an open research question and West and Linster (2003) make a beginning in this direction. Despite these shortcomings the paper has practical value since it can help a decision-maker in formulating action plans. The paper concludes on a more philosophical note claiming that fuzzy modeling opens up a host of possibilities despite its subjective elements.
Fuzzy Trigger Strategies
Goodhue (1998) applies fuzzy set theory to model collusive behavior. She examines the Green and Porter (1984) model by assuming that Þrms can use fuzzy trigger strategies. Prices are expressed as fuzzy sets. There are a Þnite number (I) of fuzzy sets denoted by P i describing the level of prices in linguistic terms. For example, "low prices" denotes one such set. The degree of membership of a price in any particular set captures the extent to which it posses the properties associated with that set. Uncertainty that Þrms face regarding the realization of demand is also modeled as a fuzzy set. One example of such a set is the set that expresses the fact that "demand is low". There are J such sets each denoted by D j . The chance of cheating in this model is deÞned on these two sets, which is made possible through the application of the Extension Principle. Interestingly, she Þnds that the fuzzy trigger pricing game reverses the standard cyclical price war prediction. Collusion sustaining price wars are most likely to occur during times of high demand. The fuzzy model also predicts that markets with relatively volatile prices are more likely to undergo collusion-sustaining price wars. The paper has some practical merits since it provides a decision maker with a set of tools that will help understand price wars and possible collusion. A drawback is the fact that it is a model of fuzzy trigger stratgies and not fuzzy games themselves.
On the relationship to the existing literature. Our goal in this paper is to provide an alternative way of modeling fuzzy games by extending the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) . This is done with objective of providing a theoretical basis to the work of West and Linster (2003) . The genarality of our model is an improvement over the linear programming type formulations, and we do provide a results for zero sum games without requiring restrictions on preferences. We believe that our model goes beyond the Greenhut et al. (1995) framework since it does provide an equilibrium concept. While Goodhue's (1998) formulation is pratical, it is quite speciÞc being designed to provide a fuzzy extension of Green and Porter's (1984) work. Our model is more general and therefore does not provide predictions as precise as Goodhue's (1998) and should be viewed as a Þrst step towards developing more general fuzzy game theoretic models.
The Model
The model developed here uses the Bellman and Zadeh (1970) approach to fuzzy decision making. We start with a standard normal form game and then proceed to fuzzify it. Let G = (N, S, Π) be the triple that deÞnes a standard normal form game where N = {1, 2} is the set of players in the game. For each player i we denote her strategies by S i and a particular strategy chosen from this set by s i . A strategy proÞle is denoted by (s 1 , s 2 ) = s ∈ S where S = S 1 × S 2 . Each player's payoff function is denoted by Π i : S → R.
Since the environment in which the game is being is complex, the game that is actually played may vary from the standard game described above. The players create their own fuzzy version of the game which can be attributed to different factors like their own subjective perception the game, presence of vaguely deÞned concepts or even boundedly rational behavior. Recall for instance, the idea of the subconscious utility function explored by Chen, Friedman and Thisse (1998) where the players only have a vague notion of their actual utility function. Bacharach's (1993) variable frame theory is also similar in the sense that different games are associated with different variable universes and lead to a different focal point in each associated game. Similarly the enivironment of West and Linster (2003) Cournot game is computationally complex. See also the the reason cited by Campos (1989) as to why a fuzzy game might be appropriate in many situations. Thus, a fuzzy game provides a way of understanding the player's modus operandi in complex game-theoretic conditions.
We will now deÞne a fuzzy version of this game. For each player i the constraint set is given by
Note that µ represents a player's perceived or fuzzy constraints. They vary in their degree of feasibility and only some of them might be considered completely feasible, i.e., have a membership value of one. This acts as a constraint on his choice of strategies. It stems from his own understanding of the game as well from his beliefs about the other player. It might capture for instance player i's belief about the other player's type or about her rationality. It can also be used to eliminate dominated strategies. We will call this a perception constraint, which in this simple case is assumed to be entirely static and non-adaptable. We next deÞne for each player a non-empty goal function
This represents each player's aspiration level, i.e., the player's fuzzy goal function. Although this function is deÞned over the action space, it could also be deÞned over the payoff space by considering a mapping from the action space to the payoff space which is then mapped on to the unit interval. 10 This fuzzy membership function could be used to capture some alternatives to utility maximization or like altruistic behavior or satisÞcing. The usual normal form game is now replaced by a modiÞed game in a fuzzy environment which we will call a "fuzzy game." This fuzzy game is formally expressed by the tripe G f = (N, µ, γ).
On the interpretation of µ and γ. We now provide a brief discussion of the a fuzzy game and its constituent elements. The aim of this paper has been to develop a fuzzy version of a standard game when the players are faced with a complex environment as in the implementation of the Cournot game in the West and Linster (2003) formulation. The perception constraint µ can be viewed an expression of the player's rationality. Sometimes it may be possible to specify all the available strategies in an abstract way, but the resulting set may be too large to be evaluated exhaustively. For example, if the problem has a combinatoric explosion of possibilities, or a continuum of strategies, then players might not evaluate all the possible strategies since they do not consider all of the feasible. Moreover, it can also be used to capture a player's boundedly rational behavior or a player's belief's about other players. For example, a set of closed and consistent can be used to deÞne a curb set (Basu and Weibull, 1994) , restricting choices only to a particular subset of available strategies. Iterated elimination of strictly or weakly dominated strategies can be captured by assigning successively lower values to dominated strategies. For example, this would accomodate Basu's (1994) explanation of why subjects will not play the Nash equilibrium in a Travelr's Dilemma. More interestingly, it could also explain behavior in the Traveler's Dilemma as the punishment-reward structure vary as in Capra et al. (1999) . Other reÞnement criteria could also be captured in a similar way. Note also that µ i must be non-empty, otherwise the player does not think that there are any feasible strategies to choose from. 11 The goal function γ is a way of describing the player's perception of his objectives. Note that the goal function need not alter the payoff rankings and this is the most likely outcome in a game. However it could be used to model some alternatives to utility maximization or combine different objectives. It could also be used to model fairness of the type suggested by Rabin (1993) , since the goal function reorders the payoff function. In Rabin's formulation, players get more or less utility in addition to what they get from the payoff function of the original game, depending on whether they feel their opponent is being nice or mean to them. Similarly, this methodology of reordering payoffs can also be extended top other psychological games (Geanakoplous, Pearce and Staccehtti (1989) ). Thus the two membership functions deÞned above are quite general and can embody a whole range of possibilities. They can be used to explore sophistication in the players reasoning, while the goal function can capture elements of psychological games and formulations of the sort suggested by behavioral game theory.
Using the two notions developed above we can now determine the player's decision set, which, in the words of Bellman and Zadeh, is the ". . .conßuence of goals and constraints," deÞned by
As can be easily deduced δ i is basically the intersection of the set of goals and the constraints facing a player. 12 We now provide an explanation for how to interpret δ and when it is useful. Discussion 2: On the interpretation of δ. The player's decision set δ can be interpreted as follows: For the particular strategy choice b s 2 ∈ S 2 of player 2, δ 1 (·, b s 2 ) represents player 1's response to this strategy using the Bellman and Zadeh approach. This means that player 1 must formulate γ i and µ i accordingly, i.e., player 1 must follow the above rule when computing his goal function. Essentially it says that for any strategy proÞle each player Þrst requires that his constraints and goals are satisÞed simultaneously. Moreover, at this juncture the player choices the one that is the easiest to satisfy. Thus the decision set expresses the degree of compatibility between a players perceptions and his goals. This facilitates decision-making on the part of the player.
It should be obvious that this approach does not have any advantages in "simple games," by which we mean games whose structure is so transparent that the components would remain unchanged even in a fuzzy environment. Since it imposes a symmetry between the goals and the constraints, it would be useful in games that involve a large number of strategies and requiring sophistication in the reasoning process, or in games with multiple equilibria. It is perhaps more of a heuristic way of looking at a game when computing the equilibrium might be difficult, a claim echoed by West and Linster (2003) . By putting the strategies and payoffs on a common platform and ensuring that they are simultaneously satisÞed, one can argue that it makes it easier to solve such a game. Indeed as West and Linster (2003) argue there is no obvious way to model the actions of players in a repeated game and one solution might be to use fuzzy rules for action choice.
In the standard game each strategy proÞle leads to an outcome over which players have preferences. In a sense our fuzzy version of a game allows players to rank their strategy choices based on their model of the other player's behavior. Players can also have preferences over the outcomes which capture their own objectives, including notions like fairness suggested by Rabin (1993) . Finally players attempt to chose the strategy that maximizes their payoff given their beliefs about the other players. This makes δ − the conßuence of goals and constraints, the natural variable to maximize. In other words, a fuzzy version of a standard game is a simple way to model boundedly rational behavior, and as suggested above may be viewed as a hueristic way of looking at some games. In such games choosing to maximize the payoff function may lead to a suboptimal situation since it would fail to take into account the rationality of the other player.
We now proceed to deÞne a Nash equilibrium in the fuzzy version and the game after which we identify conditions for its existence.
DeÞnition 10 A strategy tuple (s * 1 , s * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium in G f if for all i ∈ N , we have
Under certain standard conditions on the membership functions, we now show that such an equilibrium will always exist for the fuzzy extension G f of the game deÞned above. We will Þrst assume the following.
Assumption: For all i ∈ N, we assume that S i is compact and convex and the payoffs are continuous.
Theorem 1: For a game G f = (N, µ, γ) , if δ i is non-empty, continuous, and strictly quasi-concave in a player's own strategies, then G f has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
For each player i ∈ N, deÞne the best response function for i as r i : S → S i as follows for all s ∈ S, r i (s) = arg max δ i (t i , s −i )
From the above conditions it is obvious that such an r i (s) must exist and is unique. We also deÞne the best response function r : S → S if for all s ∈ S, r(s) = (r 1 (s), r 2 (s)). Since S i is compact and convex for all i, it follows that S is compact and convex. Now through contradiction we will show that r is continuous by showing that r i (s) is continuous for all i.
Suppose not. Then there exists s ∈ S, and a sequence {s n } in S such that s n → s, but r i (s n ) does not converge to r i (s). This and the compactness of S implies that there is a subsequence which converges to t i 6 = r i (s). Without loss of generality, suppose that {s n } itself converges to t i . Since δ i (s n \r i (s n )) ≥ δ i (s n \r i (s)) for all n, it follows from the continuity of δ i that
. This is a contradiction since r i (s) is the unique best response of player i to s.
Since r is continuous and S is compact and convex, we know by Brouwer's Þxed point theorem that there exists s * ∈ S, such that r(s * ) = s * . Thus, for all i ∈ N, δ i (s * ) ≥ δ i (s i , s * −i ) for all s i ∈ S i . So s * is a Nash equilibrium.
The fuzzy set theoretic formulation here allows us to compare the tension between the player's aspirations and constraints by assigning numerical values to strategies and payoffs in the interval [0,1]. We believe that this is in fact the most appealing feature of the version of fuzzy games developed in our paper.
We now investigate an issue that arises quite naturally in such a game. Assume that a player has a given goal function. We will now identify conditions on his strategies that will enable him to ensure a certain Þxed level of payoff γ 0 , i.e., this is similar to the concept of security level in a zero-sum game. For this purpose we assume that the players adopt a cautious approach and follow a maximin type of reasoning. For each player deÞne the following number
This number deÞnes the maximum payoff a cautious player can ensure for herself. Note also that a low C i implies that there is a big gap between a players aspirations and her feasible choices. Next we also deÞne the α-cut of the set S i as S
Proof. If S i (γ 0 ) = ∅, then it is possible that C i < γ 0 and hence the player cannot always guarantee the desired payoff. If S i (γ 0 ) 6 = ∅ and if µ i (s i ) ≥ γ 0 for at least one s i ∈ S i (γ 0 ), then from the deÞnition of C i it is easy to check that C i ≥ γ 0 will always be true.
The proposition illustrates for a given goal function what restrictions on the constraint set will ensure a pre-speciÞed payoff like γ 0 . Note that this situation however, need not be an equilibrium, unless we consider a one-sum game. 13 This is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary: Let G f be a one-sum game, and δ i be non-empty, continuous, and strictly quasi-concave in a player's own strategies. If C i ≥ γ 0 , then it is also a Nash equilibrium of G f .
Proof. We know that an equilibrium exists since the conditions required for Theorem 1 are satisÞed. Then from the deÞnition of C i where players use a maximin type of reasoning, it follows that it is the equilibrium of the fuzzy one-sum game.
Pre-play communication has some interesting implications for this model. Suppose the players can communicate before playing the game. This would clearly affect their perception set or the set of feasible choices that each player has. With pre-play communication player i will have a better notion of the strategies that player j will choose. Denote this by S 0 j ⊂ S j . This affects the minimum payoff a player can ensure for herself, i.e.,
Note that there is no fuzzy zero-sum game since δi ∈ [0, 1] always. The analogue of the zero-sum game is the complementary one-sum game, where δ i (s) = 1 − δ j (s). In other words player j's decision set is the complement of player i's decision set.
Provided S 0 j is a strict subset of the set of original strategies, C 0 i ≥ C i . Hence, exchange of information between the two players has potentially interesting possibilities in this context. In a standard game, pre-play communication does not actually alter the set of feasible choices − it facilitates coordination. In a fuzzy game on the other hand, pre-play communication actually allows for better coordination by reducing the feasible choices since it reduces the set of available choices.
A Duopoly Example
In what follows we set up a basic duopoly model and discuss the implication of making it a fuzzy game. We consider a single period homogenous product Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand function in this market is given by the standard linear formulation
We also assume that both Þrms have identical constant marginal cost functions given by C(q i ) = cq i , i = 1, 2. We can now write the proÞt function as
In the fuzzy version of this game the constraint set is assumed to be a crisp set. Thus, each Þrm considers all its strategies equally feasible, i.e., µ i (q i ) = 1 for all q i and for i = 1, 2. In order to make things simple we assume that the strategy set is compact and deÞned by q i ∈ [0, a/b]. The goal function however is fuzzy and each Þrm believes that the collusive outcome is the best possible outcome. Hence the membership function is single peaked such that γ i ( ] and γ i (q 1 , q 2 ) = 0, elsewhere. Then it can be veriÞed that we will get the results obtained in this model.
Proposition 2:
The fuzzy duopoly game as deÞned above has a CournotNash equilibrium.
Proof. It is easily veriÞed that the all the requirements of Theorem 1 are satisÞed. Note that using µ i (q i ) and γ i (q 1 , q 2 ) for i = 1, 2 we can deÞne δ i as the minimum of these two functions for each player. Since the constraint set is a crisp set, the conßuence of the goals and constraints will just be the goal function, i.e., δ i (q 1 , q 2 ) = γ i (q 1 , q 2 ). Hence δ i is non-empty continuous and concave reaching a maximum at ( is indeed an equilibrium. Hence we see that the collusive outcome can easily be supported as an equilibrium in the fuzzy game. Note that unlike the operational version of West and Linster (2003) our theoretical model does not require a Þnite and discrete number of possible choices for both players since there is no computational complexity issue in our model. Moreover we do not require linearity of the response function − for our purpose continuity alone is sufficient. It is also obvious that different types of membership functions can be used to support other situations like the Cournot-Nash outcome as an equilibrium of the fuzzy sets. This illustrates the importance of the beliefs that Þrms have about each other and the role played by their own goals in strategic interaction. As a Þnal word of caution it is worth mentioning that since the membership functions are quite subjective one can argue that this is also a weakness of the approach. 14 
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to provide a theoretical foundation for the West and Linster (2003) type formulations. In games played in complex environments the players very often develop their own understanding of the game and may use reasoning processes that make the game simpler to solve. We argue that such a heuristic process can be described as a fuzzy game. This paper develops a static model of a fuzzy game by extending the fuzzy decision theory of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) . The model developed is simple and exploratory in nature. We identify conditions that guarantee the existence of equilibrium as well as how to attain a certain minimum payoff in the game. Further, a very simple example demonstrates that fuzzy modeling allows us to sustain collusive behavior. It differs from the earlier work on fuzzy games by being closest to the standard game-theoretic framework. While it seems to have a realistic ßavor, the future research should consider more sophisticated applications and compare the results of this approach with those obtained under the standard game-theoretic formulation. We believe the most promising applications would involve cheap talk and the modeling of curb sets using a fuzzy environment. Other interesting issues would be to link the constraints faced by a player or his perception set to different degrees of bounded rationality. This would allow us to investigate equilibrium selection and reÞnements from a different perspective.
